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THE QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question presented for review is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the final administrative decision and
Order of the Industrial Commission in selecting the date of the
first medical report suggesting the unemployability of an injured
worker; i.e., September 24, 1984, as the date for commencement of
permanent total disability benefits where

(1) the worker was

injured on May 12, 1975; (2) the worker attempted unsuccessfully
to return to work and last worked on April 22, 1976; (3) the
worker has been receiving Social Security total disability benefits effective April 1, 1976; and (4) the Second Injury Fund has
stipulated to the commencement of its exposure for permanent
total disability as of April 15, 1982, precisely six years after
the initial six-year period

for compensation due and payable

exclusively by the Employer/Carrier by statute.
This inquiry also places into question the underlying difficulties associated with commencing permanent total disability
benefits on any date other than the date of the industrial accident upon which such a finding is based^ or the date the employee
last worked, whichever is later.
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINION
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals opinion of April 15, 1987 may be found
in 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59.
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Court of Appeals opinion of April 15, 1987, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(5) (1986), is reviewable as a
matter of discretion by a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

CONTROLLING STATUTES
There are no statutes which require that permanent total
disability benefits be awarded on a certain date; however, Petitioner believes that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985),
which due to its length appears in the Appendix, supports his
position that the commencement date for permanent total disability compensation is the date of the industrial accident which
effectively rendered him incapable of returning to substantial,
gainful employment.

If, however, a worker attempts unsuccessful-

ly to return to work, the commencement date of his permanent
total disability benefits is the date he last worked.

See Norton

v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 728 P.2d 1025 (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This Petition involves the review of the opinion of the

Court of Appeals affirming a final administrative decision of the
Industrial Commission holding that the commencement date for the
payment of permanent total disability benefits may be the date of
a medical report, rather than the date of the industrial accident
which unequivocably precipitated his unemployability, or the date
he last worked.

R. Vol. II, 568-577. Oman v. Industrial Commis-

sion, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (1987).
B.

Course of Proceedings
Petitioner applied for and was awarded permanent total dis-

ability benefits.

R. Vol I, 37; and Vol. II, 400-406.

Subse-

quently, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for
Review with the Industrial Commission questioning the commence-

ment date for the payment of permanent total disability benefits.

Thereafter, the Industrial Commission entered an Order

changing the benefit commencement date to September 24, 1984, the
earliest date of a medical report suggesting the Petitioner would
never be able to work again.

R. Vol. II, 576.

Oman, supra at 55

Utah Adv. 59.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's
Order regarding the commencement date.
C.

Relevant Facts to the Issues Presented
On May 12, 1975 Petitioner was injured in an industrial

accident while working as an underground coal miner with Peabody
Coal Company at the Deer Creek Coal Mine in Huntington, Utah.
The accident involved a cave-in in which three of his fellow
workers lost their lives and others, like himself, were injured.

R. Vol. II, 408.

During the month after the accident, the Petitioner was
treated

orthopedically

for traumatic

lumbosacral

sprain with

rediculitis unilateral on the left side (R. Vol. I, 47), and
psychiatrically

for depression caused by his feeling that he

could have prevented one of his co-workers from being killed.

He

complained of low back pain, restlessness, anxiety, nervousness
and an unwillingness to go back to work in the mine.

R. Vol. II,

408.
On June 15, 1975 and notwithstanding his physical and mental
problems, Petitioner returned to work in the mines where he continued to work without significant interruption until April 21,
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1976.

R. Vol. I, 136.

During that time Petitioner continued to

obtain chiropractic adjustments and therapy for his depression.
In May, 1976 Petitioner sought follow-up medical treatment
for his back which appeared to have some limitation in motion and
additional tenderness in his left buttocks.

He also had de-

creased sensation over the lateral aspect of his calf and foot on
the left side.

R. Vol. I, 167; Vol. II, 409; and Vol. I, 47.

Subsequently, on June 29, 1976 a three-level fusion was
performed by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg at the L.D.S. Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

R. Vol. I, 48; and Vol. II, 167.

Because

two of the levels failed, a second surgery was performed on
December 1, 1977, where Petitioner's back was again re-fused.

R.

Vol. II, 190-191 and 409.
On March 21, 1977 as a result of those two surgeries, the
Industrial Commission approved a Compensation Agreement awarding
Petitioner a 25% permanent partial impairment of the whole body
for his orthopedic problems.

R. Vol. I, 24.

On June 11, 1982 Petitioner filed an Application for a Hearing requesting an additional permanent partial impairment award
for his psychiatric problems and, also, requesting consideration
of a permanent total disability a^ard.

R. Vol. I, 37.

Dr. Potts, Petitioner's treating physician of approximately
five years, confirmed Petitioner's permanent total disability
status by letter on September 24, 1984 by stating that he was
"... unable to work or perform steadily...." and that he doubted
that "... his position [would] improve".
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R. Vol. II, 156.

Dr.

Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic confirmed
Petitioner's inability to work, and indicated that the Petitioner
is impaired in social, family and vocational functioning, in a
medical report of February 13, 1985, further substantiating his
total disability status. R. Vol. II, 613.
Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Corners Community Mental Health
Center in Castle Dale, Utah also confirmed Petitioner's permanent
total disability status by letter of May 21, 1985 indicating that
"... my impression at this time is that the employee is suffering
from post traumatic stress disorder with depression.

His rumina-

tion of the traumatic event, his anxiety and severe physical pain
could most definitely prevent him from working at this time". R.
Vol. II, 613-614.
And finally, Dr. Ronald G. Rubin, a psychiatrist in Price,
Utah, in a letter of July 10, 1985, pursuant to a Division of
Rehabilitation referral, indicated that Petitioner was neither
rehabilitable now nor was he expected to be so in the future, was
not employable now or in the future, and was not able to partake
in a new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled.

R. Vol. II,

614.
On October 9, 1984 the Administrative Law Judge denied Petitioner's claim to an additional award for his psychiatric impairment, but found him

"... tentatively permanently and totally

disabled and referred

[him] to the Division of Rehabilitation

Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A."

R. Vol. II, 412.
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On July 31, 1985 the Utah State Board of Education, Division
of Rehabilitation Services, found that Petitioner was ineligible
for rehabilitation because his handicap was "too severe" and a
recent psychiatric evaluation revealed that he had "... no significant work potential...."

In addition to his physical and

mental impairments, that Division also found that he had borderline intellectual functioning and reading skills primarily as a
result of his dropping out of school in the tenth grade.

The

Division issued the Section 67 certification by concluding that
there was no "... reasonable expectation that vocational rehabilitation services [could] benefit [him] in terms of employability."

R. Vol. II, 562.

The Industrial Commission readily acknowledges the following:
A.

The Petitioner "... never returned to work follow-

ing the surgery on June 29, 1976."

R. Vol. II, 409 (emphasis

added).
B.

The Petitioner was entitled to "... a tentative

finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
Applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight [now
11] years." R. Vol. II, 412 (emphasis added).
On December 11, 1985 the Administrative Law Judge entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order finding that
the Petitioner was "... entitled to benefits for permanent total
disability benefits from and after July 31, 1985...."
II, 564.

R. Vol.

The date chosen by the Adminsitrative Law Judge for the

-6-

commencement of benefits was the date of the Section 67 Division
of Rehabilitation certification of non-entitlement to rehabilitation services.

R. Vol. II, 562.

On December 19, 1985 Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the onset date of permanent total disability benefits.

R. Vol. II, 569-573. Petition-

er argued that computing permanent total disability benefits
based upon the date of the rehabilitation letter was inconsistent
with longstanding Industrial Commission policy wherein permanent
total disability benefits onset dates are computed from the date
of the industrial accident or the date an employee last worked.
On March 13, 1986 the Industrial Commission granted in part
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review.
Vol. II, 574-576.

R.

Specifically, the Industrial Commission held

11

... that the first date of medical confirmation of the Appli-

cant's permanent total disability status is a more appropriate
date to begin permanent total disability benefits...." R. Vol.
II, 576.
On April 15, 1987 the Court of Appeals affirmed the final
administrative decision of the Industrial Commission.
ARGUMENT
I
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS
NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT
Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
for review by a writ of certiorari when the Court of Appeals has
-7-

decided "... an important question of state law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court.11
The important question in this case, which has never been
addressed by this or any other Court of this state, decided by
the Court of Appeals is when the payment of permanent total disability benefits should commence.
Rep. 60.

Oman, supra at 55 Utah Adv.

The standard established by the Court of Appeals in

Oman is not found in any statute or case law decision, and is
inconsistent with other provisions of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act and the Act's remedial nature.

In addition, this new

standard created by the Court of Appeals is not even supported by
the record, to wit:
1.

That the date of a medical report containing the conclu-

sion of a medical doctor that the Petitioner was totally disabled
does not and cannot infer that the Petitioner was not permanently
and totally disabled prior to the date that the medical report
was authored;
2.

That a permanent total disability claim is one involving

factors outside of a medical doctor's expertise, and comments
relative to an injured worker's disability status are not factually and cannot be legally dispositive of that question;
3.

Assuming arguendo that permanent total disability bene-

fits may be commenced on some date other than the date of an
applicant's

industrial

accident, such an argument appears to

require that benefits are payable by an employer and its workers'
compensation carrier in excess of the statutory maximum of 312
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weeks

provided

for

in

Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

35-1-67

(1985) .
Also, this new standard created by the Court of Appeals
raises numerous unanswered questions which unfortunately leave
all parties to this case and others claiming permanent total
disability

compensation

in the unenviable

position

of being

totally unable to discern their respective rights and liabilities, to wit:
1.

Which of the identified parties —

or the Second Injury Fund —

the Employer/Carrier

is required to begin permanent total

disability benefits on September 24, 1984.
2.

For what period of time respectively are the identified

parties —

the Employer/Carrier or the Second Injury Fund — re-

quired to pay permanent total disability benefits commencing on
September 24, 1984.
3.

To what extent, if any, are the parties —

er/Carrier or the Second Injury Fund —

the Employ-

entitled to reduce their

permanent total disability obligation in this case with payments
previously made to the Plaintiff as temporary total disability
compensation and permanent partial impairment compensation for
periods of time which preceded the commencement date for permanent total disability of September 24, 1984.
And finally, Petitioner recently became aware of a decision
issued by the Industrial Commission referencing a wholly different standard regarding the onset date of disability in permanent
total disability claims.

That standard is different from that
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announced in this case by the Court of Appeals.

Specifically, in

Brundage v. Granite School District, Case No. 85000742 (November
10, 1986),

the Industrial Commission held "that the permanent

total disability did not begin until after the Applicant stopped
working," the exact standard urged by the Petitioner in this
case.

A copy of the Industrial Commission's decision is part of

the Appendix.
This recent decision by the Industrial Commission further
underscores the arbitrary and capricious nature of its decision,
and of the Court of Appeals' opinion, in the present case.
Billings Computer Corporation v. Tarango, Utah, 674 P. 2d 104
(1983).
II
THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
A QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT IS IN
CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT
Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
for review by a writ of certiorari when "... a panel of the Court
of Appeals has decided a question of state . . . law ... in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of this Court."
The decision of the Court of Appeals is Oman holding that
the date of a medical report may properly be utilized as the date
for the commencement of permanent total disability benefits is,
in addition to being contrary to specific statutory references
contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985), is also
directly contrary to the recent decision of this Court in Norton
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 725 P. 2d 1025 (1986) where this
-10-

Court in a per curiam decision specifically held that an injured
worker's unsuccessful attempts to continue working will not prevent a subsequent finding of entitlement to permanent total disability compensation.

Because compensation cannot be paid during

any period of time during which an employee is working, it is
clear that permanent total disability benefits may only commence
on the day after the injured worker last worked.

CONCLUSION

There is no established standard by which to determine the
commencement date for permanent total disability benefits.

The

Industrial Commission seems to apply different standards for each
case and the Court of Appeals has established a standard in Oman
that raises more questions than answers and presents more problems than solutions.
Furthermore, the standard announced by the Court of Appeals
is in conflict with that announced by this Court in the Norton
decision.
It is respectfully

submitted that this Court decide the

important question raised herein and judicially determine that
permanent total disability benefits begin on the day after an injured worker's impairment has forced him out of the work force.
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DATED this 15th day of May, 1987.

I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this the
15th day of May, 1987, upon the following:

David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Henry K. Chai III, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84/10
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APPENDIX
Court of Appeals Opinion dated April 15, 1987.
Industrial Commission Order granting Motion for Review dated
March 13, 1986.
Industrial Commission Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated December 11, 1985.
Industrial Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order dated October 23, 1984.
Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order dated October 9, 1984.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985).
Norton v.
(1986).

Industrial

Brundage v. Granite
(November 10, 1986).

Commission,
School

-13-

Utah,

728

P. 2d

1025

District, Case No. 85000742

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—,„ O O 0oo

Charles G. Oman,
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
Industrial Commission of Utah,
Peabody Coal Company, Old
Republic Insurance Company and
Second Injury Fund,

Case No. 860189-CA

Defendants.
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench.

FILED
APR 151987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order by the
Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total disability
benefits. The benefits were to commence as of September 24,
1984, the date permanent total disability was first medically
confirmed. Plaintiff urges benefits should commence from
either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the
day after he last worked for the employer (April.22, 1976),
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence
as of April 23, 1976. Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest
on the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission.
Plaintiff was injured in a mine cave-in on May 12, 1975
in Huntington, Utah, while working for Peabody Coal Company
("Peabody"). He was treated orthopedically for back problems
and also received treatment for depression. He returned
to work on June 15, 1975, but continued to receive medical
treatment. On June 29, 1976, a three level fusion operation
was performed on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiff's back. Plaintiff was
awarded compensation for a 25% permanent partial impairment of
the whole body for his back problems on March 21, 1977.
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a permanent total
disability award because of psychiatric impairment.
Plaintiff's total disability was confirmed by a letter dated

September., -9 / 1984, from his physician. The doctor's
confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental
heal.fclj professionals. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in
* 'accordance ^with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a
tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred
"i "^plouixitiff ^bb the Division of Rehabilitative Services for
';, evaluation training and certification. The Division found
\ ^ that g^alriitiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The
^Al£2sSc£red findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order
providing plaintiff with benefits from July 21, 1985, the date
of certification by the Division of Rehabilitation. No
interest on unpaid benefits was awarded. Plaintiff then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the
commencement date of benefits and failure to order payment of
interest. In response the Industrial Commission denied payment
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to
September 24, 1984, the first date of medical confirmation.
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that benefits should
commence from April 23, 1976, the day after plaintiff's last
day of work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating commencement of workers'
compensation no later than three days after the injury.
However, that section deals with total temporary disability
rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses Mat the time of injurylanguage to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with
wages at the time of injury. There is no statutory language
requiring benefits to commence at either the date of injury or
the last day of employment, whichever occurs later. Therefore,
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Thus, this Court must
determine if the Commission's order was supported by
substantial evidence and was a reasonable exercise of the
Commission's discretion. Norton v. Indust. Commission, 728
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet
Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).
In this instance, while the accident causing the initial
injury occurred in 1975, it was not until years later that the
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ
considered evidence that plaintiff had operated a business and
received income between 1976 (when he stopped working for
Peabody) and 1984. The ALJ's findings state that H[a]ll of the
evidence presented by the defendants was convincing in showing
the [plaintiff] is far from being totally invalid." Benefits
were awarded nonetheless, consistent with the standard referred
to in Norton, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court
stated that a worker may receive benefits who is not completely
incapacitated but is sufficiently handicapped so "that he will
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor
market." Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not totally
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and permanently disabled in 1976. His psychiatric problems,
which emanated from the 1975 industrial accident, became
progressively worse, finally culminating in total permanent
disability. As found by the ALJ, -[plaintiff] did not become
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of
the initial six year period.- The Industrial Commission did
not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the
September 24, 1984, date for commencement of benefits given the
progressivenature of plaintiffs disability and the difficulty
of determining the exact date of maturation of the disability.
A possible gap between full development of the disability and
payment of benefits will not justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp
720 P.2d 1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of
Spencer v. Indust. Commission, 87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935):
...whether an employee is totally disabled
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters
to be decided by the commissioner, as is also
the amount and time compensation may be
awarded upon all the evidence. I£ at 197.
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for
total permanent disability so long as the determination is
supported by substantial evidence and not patently
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for
commencing benefits as of the first date of medical
confirmation of permanent total disability.
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial Commission's
denial of interest on unpaid benefits. Plaintiff relies on
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8%
per annum from the date when each benefit
payment would have otherwise become due
and payable.
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held that this statute must be
retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its
intent is remedial. The case before us clearly falls within
the statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of
the statute subsequent to the injury or disability is

860189-CA

3

irrelevant. Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing from September 24,
1984.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part*

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

R. W. Garff, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

860189-CA
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No costs awarded.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 32002249

*
CHARLES G. OMAN,
Applicant,
vs.
PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURS FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER
GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On December 11, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding
the Applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits,
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund beginning July 31, 1985, the date when
the State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certified that the
Applicant was not susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the
Applicant's attorney filed a Motion for Review objecting to the date payments
were ordered to begin.
The Counsel for the Applicant argues that the
Commission practice has. been to award permanent total disability benefits
either beginning the date the employee was injured, or the date the employee
ceased working. The Counsel for the Applicant also requested an award of
interest on the benefits awarded. The Commission is of the opinion that an
earlier date is appropriate for the beginning of the permanent total
disability benefits, however the Commission declines adding interest to the
award. A brief review of the fila follows.
The Applicant was injured, while in the course of his employment, on
May 12, 19 75 in a mine cave-in. The Applicant injured his back, and had two
back surgeries as a result.
The Applicant also experienced considerable
psychiatric problems resulting from the trauma involved in the cave-in (in
which several miners were killed).
The Applicant returned to work
approximately one month after the cave-in, and worked for almost a year
afterwards, during which time he saw a chiropractor.
In June 1976, the
Applicant had back surgery (performed by Dr. T. Soderberg) and the Applicant
was deemed stabilized in December 1976. The Defendant/carrier paid temporary
total compensation in 1975 and 1976 for the periods the Applicant did not
work, and also paid for a 25% permanent partial impairment rated by Dr.
Soderberg in Oecember 1976. The Applicant required additional surgery in

CHARLES G. OMAN
ORDER:
PAGE TWO

December 1977 as a result of non-fusion, and the Defendant/carrier paid for
the surgery and the attendant temporary total disability. The Applicant was
declared stable in September 1978, and no further permanent partial
impairment, beyond the 25% already awarded, resulted.
On August 13, 1982, the Applicant, through counsel, filed an
Application for Hearing with the Commission, claiming permanent total
disability benefits, or additional permanent partial impairment benefits. In
support of the claim, in November 1983, the Counsel for the Applicant
submitted two physician reports.
Both reports discussed the Applicant's
psychiatric impairment resulting from the May 12, 1975 accident, and one of
the reports rated the impairment at 25% of the whole man. The Defendants
denied a claim for further permanent partial impairment benefits based on the
3 year Statute of Limitation specified in U.C.A. 35-1-66. The Counsel for the
Applicant argued that the Statute of Limitation did not apply because the
issue was permanent total disability for which the Supreme Court determined no
Statute of Limitation applied, and because the Commission had continuing
jurisdiction under U.C.A. 35-1-78. A Hearing was held September 24r, 1984, and
the Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on October 9, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge made a tentative
finding of permanent total disability, and the Applicant was referred to the
State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services. On November 14, 1985, a
second Hearing was held to allow testimony regarding the Applicant's
employability. This issue arose when- it was determined the Applicant may have
had some involvement in several businesses in which his wife and daughter were
engaged.
The final Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, now at issue, was filed on December 11, 1985. In that Order, the
Administrative Law Judge found the Applicant permanently totally disabled as a
result of Rehabilitation Services* inability to rehabilitate the Applicant
after nearly one year of attempts. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the
Second Injury Fund to begin permanent total disability benefits as of July 31,
1985, the date Rehabilitation Services certified the Applicant as not
susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the Commission received
the Applicant's Motion for Review arguing for an earlier date when permanent
total disability should begin, and requesting an award of interest on the
final aw?rd. The Counsel for the Applicant submits a long list of alternative
earlier dates that should have been selected by the Administrative Law Judge
as the beginning of permanent total disability. These include, May 12, 1975
the date of injury; sometime in 1976 when the Applicant ceased working; June
11, 1982 the data of the Application for Hearing; August 19, 1982 the date the
Application was filed; September 24, 1984 when the Applicant's treating
physician first found the Applicant to be permanently totally disabled;
October 23, 1984, the date the Administrative Law Judge tentatively found the
Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; November 15, 1984, the date the
Applicant was referred to Rehabilitation Services, February 13, 1985, when the
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University of Utah Pain Clinic doctor found the Applicant disabled; May 21,
1985, when a community health center employee found the Applicant was
prevented from working and finally, June 10, 1985 when a psychiatrist found
the Applicant was not employable or rehabilitative.
The Commission is of the opinion that the first date of medical
confirmation of the Applicants permanent total disability status is a more
appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits- The Commission
therefore finds the benefits should begin as of September 24, 1984. The
Commission finds that an award of interest is inappropriate, and therefore the
final Commission award is as follows.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week
commencing September 24, 1984, and continuing thereafter at intervals of'not
more than every four weeks until further order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Peabody Coal Company
and/or Old Republic Insurance, pay ail medical "expenses incurred as the result
of this accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the Commissioner

Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman

x

^^£4^W
Waiter. T. Axeigard/^Comsp&s^ionBr
Lenice L. Nielsen, Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of .atah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
//ffidav of Harch, 1^86

Linda J. StrasbUrg, Commission/Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March
1^
1986, a copy of tha attached
Granting Motion for Review in tha casa of Charles G. Oman issxiad March /J?
, 1986, was mailed to the following parsons at the following addrassas,
postage paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator of tha Second Injury Fund
Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P.O. Box 3000, SLC, UT

84110

Virginius Oabney, Atty., 136 South Main, Suite 412, SLC, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman, P.O. Box 853, Castledaie, Utah 84513
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CHARLES G. OMAN,
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vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT

PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/ or
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24,
1984, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company
and/ or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A.
Martinez, Administrator.

FURTHER HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 14,
1985, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai,
II, Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund
Baorman, Administrator.

was

represented

by

Erie V.
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FINDINGS OF FACT;
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered in
this matter on October 9, 1984, and an Amended Order was entered on October
23, 1984. Insofar as the Findings of Fact expressed in the two prior Orders
are not inconsistent with the Findings made herein, the same are incorporated
herein by reference as though fully set forth.
2. The original Order made a tentative finding that the Applicant
was permanently and totally disabled, and he was referred to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training, and certification as
required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. There was a specific finding made that no
compensation for permanent total disability was to be awarded until a final
determination was made relative to that issue.
3. At the last hearing on November 14, 1985, evidence was introduced relative to the rehabilitation evaluation.
The Applicant underwent
feasibility studies and was placed in a program where he received tutoring in
basic skills. He made positive but slow progress for a while; but finally on
July 31, 1985, Rehabilitation Services certified that the Applicant did not
meet or no longer met the legal requirement of a reasonable expectation that
vocational rehabilitation services would benefit him in terms of employability. The reason for the certification that the Applicant is not a good
candidate for rehabilitation appears to be threefold: (1) He has borderline
intellectual functioning and reading skills; (2) he suffers from a long-term
depressive neurosis; and (3) he lacks funds that might otherwise enable him to
pursue a long-term rehabilitation program.
4. At the last hearing the Defendants presented a substantial
amount of evidence relative to the Applicant's activities over the past
several years.
The thrust of this evidence was to establish that the
Applicant was in fact a partner with his wife in the operation of Kelly's Bar
in Castledale, Utah, and that he had also formerly been involved with his wife
in the operation of Chick's Fish *H Chips. The evidence also strongly implies
that the Applicant derived an unspecified amount of income from Christmas tree
sales. The Applicant testified that the Christmas tree sales were actually an
attempt on the part of his teenage daughter to earn some income and that he
was not involved in this business even though many of the customers wrote out
checks in his name in payment for the trees. He further testified that the
bar and restaurant operations were operated solely by his wife and that his
name appeared on licenses, tax returns, sales invoices, lease agreements,
et cetera, only for the purpose of credit or other business needs but was
never intended toJrtan actual partnership.
Some of the evidence presented
showed rather clearly that a lot of personal expenses were being run through
the business accounts, and the evidence rather clearly indicated the Applicant
spent quite a bit of time at the bar and that perhaps he even helped out on
occasion to a limited extent. It seems rather clear from the evidence that
the townspeople regarded the Applicant and his wife as the owners and
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operators of these businesses even though the Applicant's time involvement was
much less than that of his wife.
5. Tax returns filed by the Applicant and his wife were submitted
after the hearing for the years 1979 through 1984, In each case these were
joint returns, but for each year they showed the income and expenses of
Kelly's Bar as a sole proprietorship operated by Charles Oman. The returns
reflect substantial gross receipts from the bar, but the net income for the
years 1979 through 1982 showed either a loss or only nominal net income.
Clearly, if the only thing derived by the Applicant and his wife from the
operation of the bar was the amount reflected as net profit on the tax return,
the operation of the bar could not be justified. The net profit would not
even have been the equivalent of a minimum wage paid to part-time hired help.
The average net profit for the years 1979 through 1983 was only 2-57 percent,
of gross sales. There was an unexplained increase in net profit during 1983
and 1984 even though gross sales remained about the same as they had been
previously-. The net profit in 1983 jumped to 12.36 percent of gross sales,
and the net profit jumped to 2Q.07 percent in 1984. The last two figures are
believable and would justify the operation of the business. Although .the
income from the first four years is suspect, there mayt be an adequate
explanation; but such an explanation is not deemed important to the issue
relative to the Applicant's permanent total disability.
6. All of the evidence presented from the Applicant's doctors and
from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's claim for permanent
total disability. The prospects of successful rehabilitation are not -good,
but there is the suggestion that such might still be accomplished if the
Applicant had sufficient funds to sustain him during a long-term rehabilitation program*
7. A considerable amount of time was spent at the last hearing
reviewing a substantial number of checks made out to the Applicant, many of
which were under $100.00 but seme of which were in excess of $100.00 and in
some cases more than $500.00. The Applicant said that these did not represent
income in any way but were checks simply written out by customers who wanted
cash and the Applicant and his wife were willing to cash these checks for
them. The Administrative Law Judge is hardly convinced of any sound business
purpose being furthered by this practice, but there is no specific evidence of
any other purpose. These checks are in addition to the hundred or so checks
written out to the Applicant for Christmas trees. Most of the Christmas trees
appear to have sold for $15-00, with the price range being $10.00 to $20.00.
8. All of the evidence presented by the Defendants was convincing
in showing the Applicant is far from being totally invalid. His activity
level is such that Dave Owens, a captain in the Emery County Sheriff's Office,
did not even know that he was disabled even though he saw him frequently.
Lamar Guymon, sheriff of Emery County, testified that he had observed the
Applicant limping as he walked but he also saw the Applicant frequently during

CHARLES G. OMAN
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
PAGE FOUR

the course of a month and knew of his involvement in the operation of Kelly's
Bar.
9. In consideration of all of the evidence presented, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant is permanently and totally
disabled, but at the same time believes this determination should be subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission.
This is admittedly
paradoxical but is based upon the belief that the Applicant's unemployability
is in large part a result of his long-term depressive neurosis condition and
that such might change if the Applicant had a strong enough desire to become
employed despite his known physical limitations. It obviously will not change
absent a change in attitude.
10. The Applicant's combined physical and mental, impairment is
44 percent of whole body function* The Defendants entered into a compensation
agreement with the Applicant in 1977 by which he was paid permanent partial
disability for his 25 percent physical impairment, but nothing has ever been
paid for his depressive neurosis. The Applicant's rate of compensation was
$95.33 per week. This is less than the minimum amount payable as of the time
the Applicant was certified as not being a candidate for rehabilitation on
July 31, 1985. The minimum rate in effect at that time was $120.00 per week.
The Defendant Insurance Carrier and its insured have no further liability in
this matter except for the payment of ongoing medical expenses because the
Applicant did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the
expiration of the initial six-year period.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAM:
The Applicant is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability
from and after July 31, 1985f subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission to review and amend as circumstances may require.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund preprre the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 -pBV week
commencing July 31f 1985, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not more
than every four weeks until further Order of the Commission. The accrued
amount shall be payable in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or
Old Republic Insurance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of this
accidentt said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of this Commission.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his
attorney, but no less than $450•00 out of the accrued amount payable and
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah.Salt Lake City, Utah, this
//&
day of December, 1985.
ATTEST:

isburg
'Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on December
/'/
1985, a copy of the attached
Supplemental Order in the case of Charles G. Oman issued December
//
1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 353
Castledale, UT 84513

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

AL-UW

HTSJK.U

DeAnn S e e l y

f

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

82002249

*

CHARLES G. OMAN,
Applicant,
vs.
PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or
OLD REPUBLIC and SECOND
INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*

AMENDED

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*
*
*
*
*
x
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident - is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2c The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed.
The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in
the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers.
One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with rediculitis
unilateral on the left side."
He continued - seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
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went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go bacic into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency- these adjustments were administered. The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
4.
After
the first
surgery, the applicant entered into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery
of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommended.
Liability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.
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6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicants permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri,. a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicants psychiatric problems.
This evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric
impairment.
Dr.
Tedrow
recently
responded
to
a request
from the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his reference to "finding no evidence
of ratable impairment as early as January, 1977*% is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March
12, 1975.
A subsequent letter from Dr. Tedrow dated October 12, 1984
confirmed this typographical error and the pre-existing problem but he could
not rate it.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.
It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Canter. The
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
The
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surgeries toolc him out of the wort environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable.
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement
and therefore
not subject to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1—66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make . such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified.
In the annotation regarding the case of Soencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
"doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction
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invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbant upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brundise v. IHL Freight, 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of
the prior
compensation
agreement
entered
into
in 1977 and the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial -impairment at this late
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to
the Division of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time, A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed, by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this. 'M'1 day of October, 1984.
ATTEST:

•<.4^r}"f rf?'s?

'Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October ^ S « 1984 a copy of the attached
AMENDED ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castle Dale, Utah 84S13

A

irginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake. City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
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Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
The defendants, Peabody Coal Company and/or Old
Republic Insurance, were represented by Henry Chai,
Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund
Martinez, Administrator.

was

represented

by

Gilbert

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The
occurrence of the accident is not questioned but the extent of injuries
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt.
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time
he was killed.
The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in
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the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine
timbers.
One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of
such* The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15,
1975 and was treated for Htraumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis
unilateral on the left side***
He continued seeing a chiropractor quite
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also
went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent
or at what frequency these adjustments were administered. The records of the
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located.
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor
regarding his back problems until May A, 1976, approximately one year after
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock.
He had decreased
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was
done in December of 1977.
4.
After
the
first
surgery,
the applicant
entered
into a
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery
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j u n e 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 197 7f the applicant
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion
had failed and that further surgery was recommendedLiability for the
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional
temporary total disability through September 7, .1978. No additional permanent
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the
permanent partial disability.
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980.
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total
disability.
6.
From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no
increase in the applicant* s.^ permanent partial impairment due to his back
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his
opinion as late as 1982, The only evidence of increased impairment relates to
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr.
Frank Dituri, a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the
applicant's psychiatric problems.
This evaluation was made without the
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr.
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric
impairment.
Dr.
Dituri
recently
responded
to
a request
from
the
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident as having
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his records to finding no evidence of
ratable impairment as en rly as January, 1977 is based on his incorrect
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on,, March
12, 1975.
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled.
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It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and
perform his duties in the mine.
Similarly, his understandable psychiatric
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that
time that the industrial accident had little, long range significance. Now,
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally
disabled.
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis.
The
surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable.
After this long length of"-time there is probably no realistic hope
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but
this only compounded the problems because it removed him ^from active
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible.
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status.
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives:
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977
compensation
agreement
and
therefore
not
subject
to any statute of
limitations,
(2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and
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totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel
justified.
In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial
Commission 4 Ut 2d 135, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the
"doctrine of res judicata,„.is not in the strict sense applicable to
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction
invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago.
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives.
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts- warrant a
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years,
The
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is
incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of
Brundige v. IML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980).
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before
the
evaluation
by
Rehabilitation
Services.
Obviously,
any
other
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by
Section 35-1-67, U,C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification
of
the
prior
compensation
agreement
entered
into
in
1977
and
the
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the
Commission's inability to do so.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively
permanently
and
totally
disabled
and
referred
to
the
Division
of
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time.^ A further
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the
relevant information has been submitted.

Richard G, Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah, this cft**day of October, 1984,
ATTEST:

/Linda J. Strasburg. Commission Se'cn
Secretary
!/

1/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October ffi . 1984 a copy of the attached ORDER
was mail ed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Charles G. Oman
P.O. Box 853
Castle Dale, Ut

34513

Virginias Dabney
Attorney at Law
Suite 412, 136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Henry Chai
Attorney at Law
P 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 35-1-67 (1986)
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall
receive 66 2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than
a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week.

However, in no case of permanent total

disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312
weeks.

A finding by the commission of permanent total disability

shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as
the following proceedings have been had:

If the employee has

tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it
shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer
the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of eduation for rehabilitation training and it
shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for
use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training of the employee shall generally follow
the practice applicable under Section 35-1-69, relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries.

If the

division

f vocational

rel ib litaticr

un ier the stat^ koiri of

education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of
vocational rehabilitation in it

et forts t -i r "hil* i I \ tate rum, and

in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be paid to the employee

v/eekly benefits

at the rate of 66 2/ 3% of his average

weekly wages at the time ot the injury, but not more than a maximum ot 8ci^ uf the stafp averagp \yipRly

\nqe

it the t i IP

f the

injury per week and not lebs than a minimum of $4 5 per week plus
$5 for i dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child
undpr

t tu

i |*

H

H.iLs

j|>

i

i minimum

t

I it dependent

minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the titxip ot the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the
^tate i /Fraqi

u^ekJy waqe it the time ot the injury per week out

ot the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1),
for such period of time beginninq
ments,

with

t H time that thp pay-

\m in this section provided, to bp made by the employer or

its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the
employee.

No employee shall hp entitled in w

such benefits if

he tails or refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational
rehabilitation under this section.
All persons who

arp permanently

ind

•"italic

iisabled

and

entitled to benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection
35-1-68(1), including those injured prior 4 o March 6, 1949, shall
rDceiv«- i )f ]fs

it jn " u n per wne; *N-*n i =i L 1 un*.y b1 the second

injury fund, or when combined with compensation payments of the

employer or the insurance carrier.

The division of vocational

rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah
the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity
to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands
or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any
two thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be
compensated according to the provisions of this section and no
tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in
those instances.

In all other cases where there has been rehab-

ilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be
required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities
of any kind as provided in Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this
section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for
312 weeks.
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Factually, this case resembles Nuzum v.
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corporation, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), where the
plaintiffs decedent died from a heart attack
after manually operating a stuck dumper by
climbing in and out of a six-foot cab to
release the load. This Court in that case held
that the internal failure was a direct result of
the just-described exertion. As in that case,
the issue here is whether Miera was injured
"by accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment'' as provided by U.C.A.,
1953, §35-1-45. The administrative law
judge found that an industrial injury had
occurred, but denied compensation because
she questioned the accidental nature of the
injury.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (11/14/86), we redefined the
unexpected result of a work-related activity
as a compensable accident if both medical
and legal causation could be shown. Applied
to the instant case, the legal causation test is
satisfied, even though Miera's history of
spondylolisthesis places him in a personal risk
situation. His jumps into an eight-foot hole
from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute
intervals constitute a considerably greater
exertion than that encountered in nonemployment life and are therefore legally
sufficient. The medical causation test is likewise satisfied by the medical panel's finding
that "the work activities as described over a
three-day period could produce a lumbar
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem he
had had." No more is needed to hold that
Miera suffered a compensable industrial
accident.
The case is remanded for a medical evaluation of Miera*s industrial injury in proportion to his previous disability and a commensurate apportionment of benefit payments
between the Second Injury Fund and the
State Insurance Fund. Costs are awarded to
Miera.
WE CONCUR
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.

Cite as
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Brace D. NOR ION
Plaintiff,
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v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the
STATE OF UTAH, UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION [Self-insured
Employer], and the SECOND INJURY
FUND of the STATE of UTAH,
Defendants.
No. 21017
FILED: Novemver 25, 1986
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ATTORNEYS:
Virginius Dabney for Plaintiff
David L. Wilkinson, Erie Boorman, Phil N.
Walker for Defendants
PER CURIAM:
In this petition for review, petitioner Bruce
D. Norton challenges the decision of the
Industrial Commission denying his claim for
permanent total disability. Norton contends
that the Commission erroneously based its
findings on medical impairment alone
without examining his earning capacity,
ignored his total disability under the "oddlot" doctrine, and ruled contrary to the evidence produced by him in support of his
claim. None of the defendant parties has filed
a response. We reverse and remand for a
hearing consistent with this opinion. Norton
was employed as a coal miner of United
States
Steel in East Carbon, Utah, for thirty-nine
years of his life. He was sixteen years old
when he began working full-time in 1943 and
fifty-six when he stopped working in 1983.
He earned a living throughout those years by
dint of his brawn, performing arduous physical labor that required little, if any, skills.
Norton's literacy is marginal at best.
On August 10, 1977, Norton sustained an
injury to his neck and shoulder when a pulley
malfunctioned and sent a heavy cable crashing down on his neck with such force that
his face was embedded in the coal and he had
to be pried out from under the cable by his
companions. Initial diagnosis was contusion
over base'of neck, no fracture. Norton returned to work after one week wearing a soft
collar. Because' of persistent pain, he was
given a myelogram in December which
showed a herniated disc at C5-C6 interspace
and right shoulder traumatic bursitis. Moderate irritation of the right C6-C7 nerve roots
was found as well. Traction and heat were
prescribed as conservative treatment, with a
possibility of surgery indicated. Norton continued to suffer persistent headaches and neck
pain which have worsened with time, apparently symptoms of residual spondylosis and
spurring. His company physician advised him

For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, sec the second section of this issue.
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that the day would come when he would want
to have surgery. Norton was reluctant to take
that step and informed his supervisor that
inasmuch as he had elected not to have
surgery, he should also take himself off
compensation and return to work.
Throughout his remaining working years,
Norton intermittently underwent traction and
. physical therapy, wore a back brace, and
took pain medication. During the last eighteen months of his work his legs felt numb
whenever he turned slightly, and at one point
he experienced a fifteen to twenty minute
paralysis of his left lower extremity. His lefthand grip and strength of the left arm continued to decrease to a point where he would
drop objects and frequently lose feeling in his
fingers at night. Nonetheless, he worked until
March of 1983 when he took a medical retirement.
Norton's prior injuries included a broken
back when he was thirteen years old, resulting in lumbar spine degenerative joint
disease, right ankle traumatic arthritis stemming from a broken ankle, bilateral inguinal
hernia for which he has been in surgery three
times, hyperacidity with history of duodenal
ulcer and focal skin cancers. Impairments
developed after the industrial injury include
tendovaginitis of the right little finger, pulmonary allergic bronchitis, and hypertensive
car-diovascular disease with cardiomyopathy
aggravated by life-long obesity.
Norton was pronounced ineligible for
rehabilitation by the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation before the Commission rendered its final decision.
Basing his findings of facts and conclusions
,of law partially upon the report of a medical
panel and partially upon the report of Norton's own physicians, the administrative law
judge found a 14% whole man impairment
attributable to preexisting conditions, a 10%
uncombined permanent physical impairment
as a result of the industrial accident, raising
•the overall impairment to 23% of the whole
man, and a 31% impairment as a result of all
causes that developed subsequent to the
industrial accident. l The administrative law
judge then concluded that this impairment
construed in a light most favorable to Norton
did not require a finding of permanent total
disability. The administrative law judge noted
the impairments that followed the industrial
accident, stressed the fact that Norton continued to work for six more years after the
accident, concluded that the evidence clearly
did not warrant a determination that Norton
was permanently and totally disabled as a
consequence of his industrial accident and
therefore denied that claim. Nowhere in the
findings, conclusions and order, or in the
affirmance of that order by the Board of
Review is there any mention about Norton's
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eligibility for rehabilitation. No findings were
made on Norton's earning capacity in his
field of endeavor or elsewhere. It is this lack
of findings that mandates a reversal and
remand for further proceedings.
Under our well-settled standard of review,
we are limited to determining whether the
Commission's findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Hardman v. Salt Lake
City Fleet Management, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
(1986) (citations omitted). But where the
findings of fact do not support the award,
this Court may set aside the Commission's
award. U.C.A., 1953, §35-1-84(2).
As in Hardman, supra, where it confused
the percentage of impairment, a medical
finding, with the percentage of disability, an
administrative evaluation of earning capacity,
the Commission again failed in this case to
carry out its task. It adopted with slight
modification the findings of impairment
reported by the medical panel but then failed
in its administrative responsibility and function to evaluate Norton's permanent disability, which should have included such factors
as Norton's "present and future ability to
engage in gainful activity as it is affected by
such diverse factors as age, sex, education,
economic and social environment, in addition
to the definite medical factor-permanent
impairment." 2 As this Court has stated in
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d
208,211 (Utah 1984):
This ability is evaluated not in the
abstract, but in terms of the specific
individual who has suffered a work
related injury .... [I]n assessing the
lack of earning capacity, a constellation of factors must be considered,
only one of which is the physical
impairment. Other factors are age,
education, training and mental capacities. [Citations omitted.] It is the
unique configuration of these factors
that together will determine the
impact of the impairment on the
individual's earning capacity.
Accord Hardman, at 9. No mention is made
of those other factors here, in spite of the
fact that the Commission had before it the
evaluation of the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation that spells out Norton's vocational history, educational limitations, learning disability and age "in concert with his
multiple disabling conditions and a need for
total re-education." That evaluation presents
prima facie evidence that Norton, while not
altogether incapacitated for work, is so
handicapped that he will not be employed
regularly in any well-known branch of the
labor marketJVfarsha/i, at 212, and therefore
falls into the so-called "odd-lot" categoryHardman, at 10.
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With respect to the administrative law
judge's finding that Norton's continued work
for six years was proof that he was not
permanently totally disabled in 1983, it
should be pointed out that that fact standing
alone does not foreclose Norton's claim. The
administrative law judge correctly considered
Norton's return to work as one factor to be
weighed in determining his disability. He
erred when he failed to consider the condition
under which Norton continued his employment, as manifested by his finding "the very
fact that the applicant continued to work in
underground mining for six years following
his accident is convincing evidence that his
accident did not render him permanently and
totally disabled." Norton's decision to return
to work did not automatically disqualify him
from receiving permanent total disability
benefits, where the facts indicate that throughout the remainder of his employ he was not
restored to health. The evidence is undisputed
that Norton spent the last six of his working
years in considerable pain. Provided that a
worker's disability was also analyzed within
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case
law dealing with the factor of substantial
pain has generally held that "[a] worker who
cannot return to any gainful employment
without suffering substantial pain is entitled
to compensation benefits for total disability."
Comeaux v. Cameron Offshore Services,
Inc., 420 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 1982).
The presence of substantial pain may
logically cause an injured worker to
fall into this odd-lot category, inasmuch as it directly affects the probable dependability with which the
injured worker can sell his services in
a competitive labor market, undistorted by such factors as business
booms, sympathy of a particular
employer or friends, temporary luck,
or the superhuman efforts of the
claimant to rise above his crippling
handicaps.
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 So. 2d
1252, 1254 (La. 1980), modified 434 So. 2d
177 (benefits affirmed on substantial pain
theory alone), citing L.A. Larson, The Law
of Workmen's Compensation §10-164.49
(1980). The probability of future impairment
of future earning capacity as indicated by the
nature of the injury, the age of the worker,
and other relevant factors must likewise be
assessed. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Taylor,
468 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1971). See also Harwell
v Argonaut Insurance Co., 296 Or. 505, 678
P.2d 1202 (1984); Tsuchiyama v. Kahului
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 2 Hawaii App.
659, 638 P.2d 1381 (1982); Smith v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 304, 552 P.2d
1198 (1976). Only where the employee returns
For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATI
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to work under normal conditions will the
presumption of no loss of earning capacity
stay unassailed. Midland-Ross Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 311, 486
P.2d-793 (1971).
It may be years before the effect is
felt. But a man with a stiffened arm
or damaged back or badly weakened
eye will presumably have a harder
time doing his work well and meeting
the competition of young and healthy
men. When a man stands before the
worker's compensation court with
proven permanent physical injuries,
for which the exclusive remedy has
abolished all possibility of common
law damages, it is not justifiable to
tell him he has undergone no impairment of earning capacity, solely on
the strength of current paychecks.
Cleveland v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals, 196
Mont. 15, 636 P.2d 1386 (1981), citing Fermo
v. Superiine Products, 175 Mont. 345, 574
P.2d 251 (1978). It need not be restated at
great length that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that
any doubt with respect to the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the
injured employee. State Tax Commission v.
Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah
1984); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
Upon remand the Commission is required
to address Norton's disability in light of all
factors mentioned ante, and the burden will
be on the employer to prove the existence of
regular, steady work that Norton could
perform, taking into account his age, limited
education, and functional illiteracy, as well as
his disabling pain. Contrary to the Commission's disclaimer noted in Northwest Carriers,
at 140 n.3, permanent impairment alone is
never the sole or real criterion of permanent
disability, and a denial of permanent total
disability based on it alone invites reversal
under well-settled stare decisis.
The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
1.
Norton's challenge to the percentages
found by the medical panel and adopted by
the administrative law judge must be rejected.
The rating is proper under the formula explained in Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill
and Cabinet Shop, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah
1984), and Jacobsen Construction v. Hair,
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983).
2. See the Commission's own explanation
of the difference between impairment and
disability in Northwest Carriers Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140 n.3
(Utah 1981).
>, see the second section of this issue.
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On September 12, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the
applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits.
The Order states that the self-insured employer was to begin paying benefits
as of the date of injury, August 29, 1984, and continue until October 22,
1984, the date the applicant temporarily returned to work. No benefits were
awarded for the period during which the applicant worked- (October 22, 1984
through June 7, 1985). The Order specifies that the self-insured employer was
to begin paying benefits again on June 8, 1985, the day after the applicant's
final day at work. . The self-insured employer was ordered to continue paying
benefits until May 21, 1987, when the employer's portion of the permanent
total disability payments ($28,828.80) would be. complete. The Second Injury
Fund was ordered to begin paying permanent total disability benefits to the
applicant on May 22, 1987.
On September 24, 1986, the counsel for the defendant/self-insured
employer filed a one sentence Motion for Review requesting the Commission to
review the Administrative Law Judge's Order. No specific errors were cited.
On September 25, 1986, the counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for Review
stating that it was error for the Administrative Law Judge to fail to order
interest be paid on the accrued permanent total disability benefits. On
September 30, 1986, the Second Injury Fund filed a motion for review
indicating that the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly ordered benefits to
begin on the date of injury, August 29, 1984 as opposed to on the day
following the applicant's last day worked, June 7, 1985. Finally, on October
3
, 1986, the defendant/self-insured employer filed a Brief in support of the
September 24, 1986 Motion for review. The Brief stakes it was error for the
Administrative Law Judge to adopt the medical panel finding that the applicant
could no longer perform vocational teaching in upholstery as the treating
Physicians had found otherwise.
The Commission finds three issues have been raised by the several
Motions for Review;

:RNOM E. BRUNDAGE
1NYING DEFENDENT MOTION FOR REVIEW
LGE TWO
1.

Whether it was error for the Administrative Law Judge to find
the applicant permanently totally disabled in relying on the
medical panel as opposed to the treating physicians.

2.

On what date should permanent total disabi lity benefits begin

3. . Whether interest should be awarded on the accrued benefits.
Addressing first the issue raised by the defendant/self-insured
^ployer, the Commission finds it must deny this motion. The Administrative
iw Judge is never bound by the findings or opinions set forth by the treating
lysicians. The medical panel is utilized to provide compentent unbiased
lalysis of the medical aspects of the case, and reliance on the medical panel
j correct unless there is some good reason shown why the medical panel*s
>port should not be given credit. The counsel for the defendant/self-insured
.iployer has given no reason why the medical panel report should be rejected,
id therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's
iliance on the medical panel report, and thus, affirm the findings of
Minanent total disability.
Addressing the issue of the date when permanent total disability
mefits are to begin, the Commission must agree with the Administrator of the
icond Injury Fund.
It is inconsistent to find the applicant to be
*rmanently totally disabled if he in fact can and does work. It is more
msistent and logical to find that the permanent total disability did not
igin until after the applicant stopped working. Therefore, the self-insured
tiployer's portion of the permanent total disability benefits should be paid
^ginning June 8, 1985, the day following the last day worked, and continuing
)r 109.2 weeks until July 12, 1987. The $2,391.45 in temporary total
Mitpensation already paid by the employer should be considered an advance on
le employer's total liability for permanent total disability benefits. The
ciount of $2,391.45 subtracted from the employer's total liability of
£8,828.80 equals $26,437.35. Therefore, the employer shall pay $242.10 per
iek for 109.2 weeks from June 8, 1985 through July 12, 1987, totaling
£6,437.35. Beginning July 13, 1987, the Second Injury Fund shall begin
lying the applicant $264.00 per week,
With respect to the interest issue, the Commission finds the
Latutorily allowed interest shall be added to the accrued benefits payable by
le self-insured employer. The Administrative Law Judge's September 12, 1986
rder is therefore amended to read as follows;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District,
lall pay the applicant, Vernon E. Brundage, compensation at the rate of
£42.10 per week for 109.2 weeks fcr a total of $26,437.35 as compensation for
ranite School District's 15/43 or 15% share of the ^applicant's permanent
>tal disability benefits resulting from the industrial accident of August 28,
*84; said benefits to commence effective June 8, 1985 and to continue through
ily 12, 1987.

VERNON E. BRUNDAGE
DENYING DEFENDENT HOTION FOR REVIEW
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District,
shall pay interest on the accrued benefits in the amount of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District,
shall pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred by the applicant as a
direct result of the industrial accident of August 28, 1984; said expenses to
be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District,
shall pay Arthur F. Sandack, attorney for the applicant, the sum of
$10,247.65, as attorney fees in this case for a permanent total disability
award, pursuant to Section 35-1-87; said amount to be deducted by the
defendant employer from the aforesaid award of the applicant and to be paid
directly to the attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place the applicant, Vernon E.
Brundage, on the Second Injury Fund payroll effective July 13, 1987, with
payments to be made at the rate of $264.00 per week for as long as the
applicant shall live, or until further notice of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.
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